“all registered parties to have the right to participate. ” and “A candidate would be nominated if they topped the ballot in their own party, and that party received at least 1,000 votes – politics doesn’t need joke candidates.”

Suggests that as well as not needing joke candidates you also think politics doesn’t need single issue or independent candidates who would seem to be at an incredible disadvantage under this system.

“Oh, yes, STV. Why we should introduce a system which would insulate MPs of all parties those of their constituents who don’t share their politics, I’ve no idea.”

And I have no idea how you come to this conclusion. How exactly is it that in a system where *only* the candidate with over 50% of the vote after preferences that MPs would be “insulated” from the real politics of the constituency?

I stand by the previous point I made in the other thread on primaries. I don’t disagree with them, I just don’t see what difference they’re likely to make other than make people believe that they have more control over the direction of the country when they don’t, they just have the power to pick the people that will get whipped in to voting for the government, in a situation of parliament which would be no better than it is now.

I’m still 50/50 on fixed term parliaments, I don’t think they solve much of a problem either other than to take power away from the incumbent party, but replace it with a situation of victims of circumstance on the flip-side. If we were talking about more open and transparent governance then wouldn’t an independent panel be more apt to be able to invoke an election as soon as the national outlook for one looked balanced, after and before certain dates, to ensure a party doesn’t delay elections to unfairly gain, but also isn’t dropped in the shit by some fixed date (and equally could still be dropped a huge bonus by the fixed date, it’s all too circumstantial for me)?

Ultimately you’re doing the same as David Lammy did, and that’s to assume that if you change the process of electing people slightly in to a more popular format (and I still contest the primaries format isn’t necessarily popular unless you have truly unique and inspirational candidates going head to head) that suddenly you’ll make politics more “open” and “fair”. I am all for STV because unlike these other arguments STV would actually ensure that constituents were getting who, on balance, they agree with in parliament…but I’ve always said there are weaknesses in that system due to the way parties operate in parliament…

The first and only thing that needs to be done is true reform of the political process, removing the link between an MP and their party in anything more than a shared set of political beliefs, to therefore remove this idea of people voting because of a party line rather than what they as representatives of a constituency and a political expert (supposedly) decide, and to also reform the way debate and legislation is dealt with. After all of these electoral reform may make a bit more of a difference, because after all of these people might actually think their government does something for them.

Just for the record, this piece was originally drafted before David Lammy’s article was posted here.

Tony – my proposal wouldn’t stop single-issue candidates from running. It would simply require them to obtain 1,000 votes in the primary. Kidderminster Health Concern, for example, would easily have been able to do so. And anyway it wouldn’t apply to by-elections which is where they usually turn up – wholesale, these days!

Lee, I accept I didn’t really give STV a proper discussion, but that makes two of us! If there are multiple members representing a consitutency, I’m sure they tend only to hear from their supporters – why wouldn’t people write to the MP they identify with? I know that when I’ve wanted to contact a GLA member I go to the Green on the list, not my “constituency” member – a different system, granted, but the same outcome.

As to the merits of fixed and “floating” terms, your points are fair, although I don’t really think that the independent panel is a runner! What you’re really looking at is judicial review and that’s a whole other can of worms. I think it is fair to say that those countries where parliaments do serve fixed terms don’t see any need to change, and that I think is worth noticing. Of course, if a Parliament were so hopelessly hung that no stable administration could be formed it would have to pass an exceptional Bill dissolving itself, but that I think is more of a theoretical than a practical problem.

“Why we should introduce a system which would insulate MPs of all parties those of their constituents who don’t share their politics”

Oh this is complete bollocks, but since Lee has already said what I was going to say, I’ll get on with the netcast. Should have known when I saw the dismissive phrase “STV fetishists” that this would wind me up…

As for David Lammy, I’ll repeat what I said somewhere in the depths of that thread: if we had been told from the start that this was a reprint of a speech intended for a different audience, rather than letting it appear to be a blog post just for us, I’m sure the reaction to it would have been different.

Mike, err…

Should the strapline not read:

Why a fixed-term Parliament might be needed?

Doug: I actually thought, upon reading the headline, that this would be a great idea about ensuring parliament is elected in two halves, to keep public interest in the process going, while not increasing the “workload” on people to vote. But unfortunately it was the same old, same old

“I actually thought, upon reading the headline, that this would be a great idea about ensuring parliament is elected in two halves, to keep public interest in the process going, while not increasing the “workload” on people to vote.”

Glad it wasn’t just me. Damn you and your stealing of my thoughts!

“It would simply require them to obtain 1,000 votes in the primary.”

It’s moot, but surely you mean a percentage of total votes cast. A joke candidate is ony as much of a joke as the other candidates, and if they can’t gather more than 10,000 votes then why should an independent have to gain 10% of it?

“Lee, I accept I didn’t really give STV a proper discussion, but that makes two of us! If there are multiple members representing a consitutency,”

So now you’ve moved from STV to multi-member constituencies. I didn’t say anything about multi-member constituencies I’m afraid since I don’t agree with them.

“What you’re really looking at is judicial review and that’s a whole other can of worms.”

Why? The only purpose of the panel would be to invoke an election when they independently assess the mood of the nation to be, within reference to trends, at a typical point, to stop a government hanging on and waiting for things to get better for them. Is this any worse than a fixed term lottery on how powerful the right/wrong government becomes, or a government choosing an election at only the most opportune time?

“I think it is fair to say that those countries where parliaments do serve fixed terms don’t see any need to change, and that I think is worth noticing.”

Our government goes a long way to trying to convince us that the electoral system doesn’t need to change. People in power don’t change the way they got in power.

I think it is fair to say that those countries where parliaments do serve fixed terms don’t see any need to change, and that I think is worth noticing.

I’m not sure what you can reasonably interpret from such a lack of change. They might not have changed because they see no overall benefit; they might not have changed because the governing party at the time thinks it would be detrimental to them. A lack of change might not be due to one system being better than another, but rather the motivations of the politicians.

Um, Lee?

So now you’ve moved from STV to multi-member constituencies. I didn’t say anything about multi-member constituencies

In the British context, STV is multi-member constituencies, if you’re advocating a single member constituency system with preferential voting you’re, in British parlance, talking about AV (Alternative Vote), the USians call it “Instant Run-Off” for some unfathomable reason.

So when we’re talking STV, we’re talking a return to multi-member constituencies, but with a voting system designed for them. Worth noting that those who oppose them on the grounds of British “tradition” or the “constituency link” are talking out of their arse, because until the ‘51 election, a lot of MPs were elected in multi-member constituencies, and until the late 1800s it was the norm. In addition, STV used to be used for some of them.

Mike? You appear to want to exclude independents completely, which is undemocratic, and you also want to force all parties to select their candidates via your preferred system, which is illiberal.

The Lib Dems already run primaries for their candidates, it’s called balloting the members, a system that works effectively. What other parties do is up to them—Lammy was specifically talking about what Labour should do, not what all parties should do.

As your two paragraph dismissal of STV doesn’t seem to make coherent sense and your later comment

why wouldn’t people write to the MP they identify with? I know that when I’ve wanted to contact a GLA member I go to the Green on the list, not my “constituency” member

shows that you’ve not fully thought things through. Some will just dgo to the person they support most, others will go to all. In fact, my friend Paul recently contact all his MEPs on an issue we both feel strongly about, and received responses from three of them, two of whom I know he disagrees with on mostly all issues.

MPs under STV would not be insulated, and I’m unclear why you think the Irish system of competing for votes from supporters and not is worse than the US system where the intemperate anti-ism of some of the factions seems to have significantly damaged the Democrats.

If you can rephrase your objection to STV in a coherent fashion that makes sense I’ll try and address your points fairly? As it is I don’t fully understand your objection and thus the above may be a bit too dismissive.

“So when we’re talking STV, we’re talking a return to multi-member constituencies,”

Well I’m just getting my terminology mixed up then, whenever I’ve seen STV it’s only been with one position involved, as you say comparably to AV. Needless to say I still don’t agree that multi-member constituencies are going to solve any problems, nor does it enable independents any greater chance of getting elected as far as I’m concerned.

[10] MatGB, I think people contact their MPs for two reasons, “casework” issues and campaigning – I agree that if the purpose is the latter they will contact all their MPs in a multi-member seat. For the former purpose though, I think they’ll go to the one they think will be most sympathetic, i.e. the one they voted for. Thus if an issue particularly affects a particular social group which supports party X, MPs of other parties may not pick it up.

You’re quite right about the fact we’ve had multi-member seats elected by both FPTP and STV in the past – the latter only in University seats where it was presumably thought the electorate could cope! Most multi-member FPTP seats only returned two members, the only exception I can recall being the City of London in the 19th century. It remains the norm in English local government, alas.

For what it’s worth, I would support the introduction of STV in local council elections. My reference to “fetishists” wasn’t altogether serious, sorry if anyone’s gone off in a huff…

More generally, I do think that candidates in a General Election should be able to demonstrate that there is a significant body of opinion which supports their contesting the seat, and I don’t regard my proposal as in principle more illiberal than the present requirements for nominations and deposits (which would beabolished under my suggestion).

I take the points made about foreign experience of fixed term parliaments: on balance I still prefer them. I’m open to correction, but I think the history of “fixed termers”, whether you look at the US constitution or the various proposals of radical groups in England in the mid-17th century – and the Chartists much later, too – is one of seeking to curb executive power.

Thanks for all your replies of whatever tenor – I’ll pop in here again in the second half of the afternoon.

This discussion is following terribly conventional lines, so I feel like bowling a googly.

There are several things being placed simultaneously up for discussion here and they are all getting overlapped.

The term length of parliaments does need to be flexible to deal with unforeseen circumstances, but twice in the past few decades we have seen landslide victories reinforce the position of the government of the day. These were unnecessary elections which wasted a lot of time, effort and attention while having the effect of giving the leader a sense of overconfidence which led them to subvert the system to the detriment of society and wider relations – in other words these elections worked against curbing unfairly executed power. So I suggest we might also consider lengthening the period before which an election must be called, perhaps to 6 years.

The idea of a ‘mixed’ method of electing our representatives definitely bears further investigation, but I remain to be convinced that election by halves or quarters is anything more than a method of building opposition, rather than improving accountability or the standard of our politics. The general election is a rare occasion for the whole nation to act together and speak with one voice so to lose this unique unifying opportunity would have a serious impact on national cohesion, though it is probably appropriate at other levels.

There is definitely much to be said for different methods of casting our votes, so there it no reason to favour one at the exclusion of all others, but again, as there are multiple levels to representative government it is a case of appropriateness. If there is a fetish being exposed here it is for myopia towards the offices of the national executive which are currently monopolised by the House of Commons, but this is a historic oddity and creates a break in the chain of democracy which could easily be rectified by applying different systems to different chambers of representation.

My preference is for the House of Commons to be elected by some method of commonality (eg AV or STV) while the House of Lords appears partially suited to directly-elected FPTP constituencies (although non-geographic communities also need to be reflected in the make-up of the body). I would also free local areas to make decisions about what they think works best for them, so I’d expect to see some diversity from region to region to reflect the differences that exist.

Finally (though this is only relevant to an FPTP system), bearing in mind the neglect which tribal constituencies grow used to (as seen in Glasgow East), in terms of political activity both on the ground and in parliament, it would be interesting to enforce say 10 by-elections in those constituencies with the lowest turnout, possibly ruling that these must occur before parliament be dissolved and a GE be called. Now that might put a cat among the pigeons.

Mike,

You had me thinking about the origins of the Labour Party, as you do.

I found this quite an interesting comment, a contribution to the debate by the House of Commons Home Affairs Committee into the state of the United Kingdom’s electoral law and administration, by one Professor Robert Blackburn, BA, MSc, PhD, FRHistS, Solicitor, Professor of Constitutional Law, University of London (King’s College) from ten years ago.

Prior to 1918 candidates had been nominated without any need to deposit sums of money with the returning officer. The Home Office’s invention of the deposit in 1918 was barely mentioned, let alone properly discussed, during the otherwise very lengthy debates on the parliamentary passage of the Representation of the People Act, but a tacit acceptance seems to have existed at the time that some capital requirement was a good idea in order to keep out unsuitable candidates. Undoubtedly, there were many within the political establishment at that time who regarded the fledgling Labour Party and its trade union and working class candidates (who would be hit hardest by the requirement of a deposit) as less than top-class parliamentary material and a potential threat to the good government of the country. This same idea of the deposit being a tool for keeping out “unsuitable” candidates is still inherent in our law today and is democratically indefensible.

The only answer, presumeably being that you have to get a suitable number of signatures on your ballot nomination. Which is what the good Professor suggests, too.

Whilst it is against my nature to be fair to the Libertarian Party, it is perhaps a shame that they didn’t fight H & H. I see no democratic reason whatsoever – if they had been able to raise, say 200 signatures from within the constituency – why they should have had to risk a penny.

What I am trying to say here is that it is democratic to expect a reasonable number of voters to back a candidates nomination, what is unreasonable is to place a stricture on them.

Especially in the light of what history suggests to us.

thomas, do you mean

it would be interesting to enforce by-elections in those 10 constituencies with the lowest turnout

and that’s to assume that if you change the process of electing people slightly in to a more popular format (and I still contest the primaries format isn’t necessarily popular unless you have truly unique and inspirational candidates going head to head) that suddenly you’ll make politics more “open” and “fair”.

What’s wrong with making that assumption?

@15 if you want, but I think there will be some rotten boroughs which reoccur regularly!

Me @ 14,

Sorry, the reference for the quote is:

http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199798/cmselect/cmhaff/768/768ap24.htm

and it’s financial strictures I meant in my penultimate para.

“What’s wrong with making that assumption?”

What’s right with the assumption? Everyone is jumping around like puppies at the “success” of primaries in American politics without providing one shred of evidence that it was the primary system that invigorated the public as opposed to the campaigning of two unique candidates both with a “history in the making” context behind them. I mean who gave any care to the Republican campaign when it was clear that Huckabee wasn’t a contender after all? If you look at the republican example, actually, it’s the perfect example of showing how it isn’t necessarily any more open and fair anyway, with McCain running away with many votes because of a “winner takes all” system.

I think I worked out that if Obama and Clinton were doing a similar winner take all system rather than PR (which is the real aspect of creating open and fair contests) then Obama would have ended up with anywhere between 100 and 300 fewer votes than Clinton after Super Tuesday, and would almost certainly have not been able to gain the momentum he did due to the PR system.

If you want to talk about openness and fairness in British Politics, can we please first talk about who decides what legislation and bills gets priority in parliament, about using PR in all elections, and untying MPs from their party enough to enable better local representation, rather than a system that by itself offers no promise or guarantee of doing what is claimed?

[19] Lee, I wonder if you mightn’t offer Sunny a piece on the uses and abuses of political parties? After all, they are but means to an end and I think we could do more justice to your views in a thread of their own.

Could I just raise here a point here that I made on the thread Mike refers to? Which is worth considering.

If we did have a system of fixed five year Parliaments, then absent a vote of no confidence within the House of Commons itself, the Government should have absolutely no say over the date of an election.

But the people should.

If, in extraordinary circumstances, sufficient folk were exercised to call for a general election, say x% of the electorate, then it would and must be called. That would be a genuine return to a consensual politics.

x% would have to be a high enough figure to stop it being used vexatiously and low enough to be a possibility.

You’ve a good point Mike, and I don’t mean to hijack, I just think that there’s an assumption that seems to be made that if you change some processes with parties and governments suddenly people will engage and like them more. Fixed term is, in all fairness, better than the current system, it’s just that without government and oppositions being *better* it really doesn’t make it much fairer.

Douglas, how do we determine “sufficient folk are exercised to call for a general election”?

Lee, I agree that it is important we debate the priority and timetabling of Bills, but this doesn’t seem exclusive from the debate on fixed and non-fixed term Parliaments – for one thing, a ruling party will introduce legislation at times convenient to them. What better time than an election to introduce legislation on something that saves people money / protects them from terrorism, for example?

ukliberty @ 23,

I’m just running the idea up the flagpole. Deep breath,

I’d think that all you’d need was a call for a plebicite. So, through the internet, you could create a petition that called for an election. It would be a standard petition, without any dog whistle issues attached. So it would say, every time it was called:

“This government has lost the faith of the electorate, we, the undersigned call for an immediate General Election.”

If sufficient people signed it, then firstly it would be broadened out to a proper referendum, preferably via postal / electronic voting. It would stay open for an agreed period, perhaps a month or six weeks. If your petition reached whatever % was agreed, and it’d have to be a high number, say 30% of the electorate, then the government would be forced to dissolve parliament and call said election.

Something like that. I can only think of one occasion in modern times when it might have been called, and that was over the invasion of Iraq. Where, I at least, think it might have concentrated the views of Westminster on us, the electorate, rather than on their chums in Washington. Most attempts probably wouldn’t get out of the starting block.

It is aimed at having a mechanism in place to constrain a government that has gone severely off the rails, not as an attempt to undermine representative government.

preferably via postal / electronic voting.

Ah, splendid, pick the system most open to fraud and general verification problems.

Less flipantly, it seems to me that breaking the party stranglehold requires an additional step – directly electing the Prime Minister. (A directly elected PM requires a fixed term IMO).

Jono, who or what requires a directly elected PM to be subjected to a fixed term?

Otherwise, who decides?

If the PM decides, he can use it whenever he wants as an ad hoc referendum when Parliament wont give him what he wants. If Parliament decides, then they can foist an election on the PM when it is the worst possible moment for him. If it requires agreement, then with one party controlling Parliament and the PM from a different one, you’d end up with de facto fixed terms with them failing to agree and hitting the maximum , with them from the same party you’d have all that is wrong with the current system.

I believe that the current system is wrong because it gives the incumbent party additional advantage – not only do they get the advantage of being incumbent, but they get to have the election at a time they consider to be the most favourable (or at least the least unfavourable), but you also have the wild speculation that arises like last autumn.

Jono,

Remember the flagpole I was running this up?

If you’ve a better suggestion I’m more than happy to hear it.

However, these is absolutely no evidence from the US system: over the last seven odd years or so: that a directly elected President, even on a fixed term deal, can be constrained from – oh, I don’t know – making a complete and utter mess of things.

Now, is there?

My suggestion is merely to hand the right of recall of a Government – in extremis – back to where it ought to have lain in the first place, with us.

I accept that there are audit issues around my suggestion, but these were presumeably overcome in previous referenda. So, lets find a solution to that.

The only other exception to them running to term would be if they lost a vote of no confidence in the House. The Prime Minister would not be able to call an election. In the normal run of events, terms would be fixed at five years.

I believe that the current system is wrong because it gives the incumbent party additional advantage – not only do they get the advantage of being incumbent, but they get to have the election at a time they consider to be the most favourable (or at least the least unfavourable)

But Jono, the counterpoint is that the incumbent will delay introducing legislation (or some other measures) that will improve its standing until the nearing the end of the fixed term.

That isn’t a counterpoint, because they do that and get to pick a time when the circumstances outside their control are favourable at the moment – “Election budgets” are well known, for example.

“What better time than an election to introduce legislation on something that saves people money / protects them from terrorism, for example?”

It’s completely exclusive from periods of election, because one way or another governments in power can still do this, fixed or otherwise. So it’s a separate discussion really that will be held at another time.

I still say, on deciding when to have elections, an independent panel is the way forward, especially if taking in to account polling data on desire for an election as a key priority in that decision. The thing is an election, to my mind, should only be held when the atmosphere is such that for any given period of time (say 6 months, arbitrarily picked) the circumstances in the economy, crime, etc can be called “normal”, not when those in power, or the oppositions, are to be disadvantaged for holding it then, and when (as I think douglas said) the public actually have a desire to have an election.

Maximum terms are a good idea, but allowing elections to happen any time in a three year period, (again, arbitrary) without any control able to come from those in power, but also without the knowledge you could be shafted by circumstance, surely encourages a more rounded governance that works all year around every year?

I’m just throwing stuff out there, it’s an interesting subject

Lee, inflicting the decision of a panel which cannot be guaranteed to be independent is selection by non-representatives – in this context you’d end up balancing the interests of even less people, because any panel would be biased towards upsetting all equally.

I think you’ve slipped over the line in this case from being opposed to ‘arbitrariness’ towards being opposed to ’subjectivity’ – the creative tension which exists between the HoC and the leader of the largest party is the best balance against arbitrary rule, so by introducing a directly-elected presidential system or an outside panel we would reopen the door to excessive executive control done away with around the civil war.

I don’t think elections are about having a fair fight, but a free fight, so I’m quite happy with there being an a favorite, an underdog and an outsider – and I’m perfectly satisfied that the convener should be able to control the deciding vote in the case of a split decision.

We can all too easily forget that the electorate can be a perverse bunch liable to react against percieved injustices, so deliberately contriving elections rarely do the incumbent any favours and we all have longer memories than we are given credit for.

Perhaps we ought to ask a more basic question: what conditions make an election necessary?

“because any panel would be biased towards upsetting all equally.”

There’s no reason why a panel could not be independent enough to do the job, especially in a transparent environment with strict rules.

If we’re going to start asking what conditions make an election necessary then you start making a list of criteria that can be much better balanced by an objective group of people that have to justify their decision based on that criteria.

Lee, you’re being slightly optimistic here.

If you can name one objective person then you deserve to win all future lotteries and that person deserves to be the single benevolent dictator for all eternity, but it won’t happen because it is impossible.

No environment can be transparent enough to enable sufficiently absolute justification and no rules can be complete enough or strict enough to ensure your hope – delegation doesn’t always ensure accountability, more often than not it obviates against it.

Anyway parliament itself is already supposed to provide the most accurate balance of views and talents to create that objective view, and individuals must also justify to a competitive level of acceptability all their decisions to gain or maintain their membership in the first place. So in other words you’re really providing an argument for the current system, with additional wrinkles ironed out.